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CONSIDERATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE FIT UNDER EQUAL
PROTECTION, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, AND FREE
SPEECH DOCTRINE: SEPARATING QUESTIONS OF
ADVANCEMENT, RELATIONSHIP AND BURDEN
R. Randall Kelso*
I. INTRODUCTION
Whenever a court reviews legislation under an equal protec-
tion, substantive due process, or free speech analysis, the court
considers whether the fit between the legislature's chosen
means and intended ends is sufficient to pass constitutional
muster. The Supreme Court analyzes these "fit" questions by
considering the manner in which the statute achieves its bene-
fits and burdens in terms of whom the statute regulates and
whom the statute fails to regulate.' Of course, these "fit" ques-
tions are different depending upon whether the Court uses
minimum rationality review, "heightened" rational review, inter-
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law; BA., 1976, University of Chi-
cago; J.D., 1979, University of Wisconsin.
1. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTUTONAL LAW
370-71, 571-73, 952, 1034-35 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing the legislative fit analysis
under the Equal Protection, Due Process, and free speech doctrine) [hereinafter
NOWAK & ROTUNDA]; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-3 at
797-804, § 15-2 at 1306-07, § 16-4 at 1446-50 (2d ed. 1988); Leonard Ratner, The
Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048, 1075-96 (1968) (examin-
ing legislative fit and due process); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 WA. & MARY L. REV. 189, 190-97 (1983) (discussing the legisla-
tive fit and free speech doctrine); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 343-65 (1949) (discussing legislative fit
and equal protection).
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mediate review, or strict scrutiny.2 But in all cases, the ques-
tion of legislative fit plays a large part in the analysis.
This article explores the three different aspects of the legisla-
tive "fit" inquiry in light of recent Supreme Court precedents.
Historically, the Court has not been careful to distinguish
among the three different aspects. Recent cases, however, indi-
cate that the Court is paying closer attention to this aspect of
constitutional analysis.
II. THE THREE ASPECTS OF LEGISLATiVE FIT ANALYSIS: AN
OVERVIEW OF ADVANCEMENT, RELATIONSHIP, AND BURDEN
Three different questions must be addressed when consider-
ing a statute's fit with its intended ends. The first of these
questions, the advancement inquiry, asks what governmental
ends the statute actually advances. This inquiry determines
whether the statute advances compelling governmental inter-
ests; important, substantial, or significant governmental inter-
2. See generally NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 370-71, 573-80, 1090-93.
As noted in an earlier article, the Supreme Court actually applies six different levels
of review under Equal Protection, Due Process, Free Speech, Contract Clause, Takings
Clause, dormant Commerce Clause, and other related constitutional doctrines. See R.
Randall Kelso, Fillings Gaps in the Supreme Court's Approach to Constitutional Re-
view of Legislation: Standards, Ends, and Burdens Reconsidered, 33 S. TEX. L. REV.
493, 497-508 (1992). These six levels of review involve three kinds of rational review
(minimum rationality review, basic rational review, and rational review with bite);
two kinds of intermediate review (basic mid-level review and mid-level review with
bite); and strict scrutiny. Id. In this article, the basic elements of minimum rationali-
ty review regarding legislative fit are summarized infra at text accompanying notes
20-21; the basic elements of basic rational review and rational review with bite are
summarized infra at text accompanying note 22; and the basic elements of mid-level
review, mid-level review with bite, and strict scrutiny are summarized infra at note
19.
For purposes of clarity, the phrase "rational review" is used in this article only
when referring to all three kinds of rational review which the Court has employed.
The phrase "heightened rational review" is used when referring to the two versions of
rational review more stringent than minimum rationality review: basic rational review
and rational review with bite. The phrase "intermediate review" is used when refer-
ring to both basic mid-level review and mid-level review with bite. Finally, the phrase
"heightened review" is used when referring to intermediate review and strict scrutiny,
that is, any review higher than rational review. When a particular kind of rational
review or intermediate scrutiny is referenced, the particular term, such as minimum
rationality review or basic mid-level review, is used.
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ests; legitimate or permissible governmental interests; or imper-
missible governmental interests.'
The second and third questions that must be addressed when
considering a statute's fit involve consideration of the statute's
benefits and burdens in terms of whom the statute regulates
and whom the statute fails to regulate. The second question
concerns the relationship between the statutory means and the
benefits achieved by the statute. This relationship inquiry has
two parts: (1) the extent to which the statute fails to regulate
all individuals who are part of some problem (the
underinclusiveness inquiry); and (2) the way in which the stat-
ute serves to achieve its benefits on those whom the statute
does regulate (the service inquiry).4
The third question that must be addressed involves the na-
ture of the statute's burdens. This burden inquiry also has two
parts: (1) the extent to which the statute imposes burdens on
individuals who are not intended to be be regulated (the
overinclusiveness inquiry); and (2) the amount of the burden on
individuals who are properly regulated by the statute (the op-
pressiveness or restrictiveness inquiry).5
Before 1976, the Supreme Court did not carefully consider
the three separate inquiries of advancement, relationship, and
burden. This lack of careful consideration was not critical at
that time because prior to 1976, only minimum rationality
review and strict scrutiny were used to analyze Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process Clause challenges. Under minimum ratio-
nality review most statutes are constitutional, while under
strict scrutiny, most statutes are unconstitutional.' Since the
advent of intermediate scrutiny in 1976, however, closer consid-
eration of these three separate inquiries has become increasing-
ly important.
Craig v. Boren7 is the seminal 1976 case which inaugurated
3. See discussion infra part H.A
4. See discussion infra part TI.B.
5. See infra part II.C. Because it mirrors the phrase "least restrictive alterna-
tive," which the Court has used with strict scrutiny, see infra note 71 and accompa-
nying text, the remainder of this article refers to this as the "restrictiveness! inquiry.
6. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 573-80.
7. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). For a discussion of Craig v. Boren as inaugurating inter-
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intermediate review. In this case, the Court used the phrase
"substantially related to achievement of [important governmen-
tall objectives" to encompass all three aspects of the legislative
"fit" analysis.8 In Craig, the Court held that an Oklahoma
statute preventing males under 21 from buying 3.2% beer,
while only preventing women under 18 from buying 3.2% beer,
did not have a "substantial relationship" to the state's interest
in reducing teenage drunk driving.9 First, reflecting the ad-
vancement inquiry, the Court assumed that the State was try-
ing to advance a substantial or important governmental interest
by attempting to reduce teenage drunk driving.' Then, exam-
ining the service component of the relationship inquiry, the
Court noted that the statute did not substantially serve the
government's end." Regarding the underinclusiveness aspect of
the relationship inquiry, the Court noted that the statute was
substantially underinclusive. 2  Finally, reflecting the
overinclusiveness aspect of burden analysis, the Court noted
that the statute was overinclusive because it unduly burdened
males who were not likely to drink and drive.'
Since 1976, the Court has distinguished more clearly the
relationship inquiries of underinclusiveness and service from
the burden inquiries of overinclusiveness and restrictiveness
with clarification of the "narrowly drawn" and "least restrictive
alternative" components of burden analysis.'4 The Court under
mediate review, see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 734.
8. 429 U.S. at 197.
9. Id. at 204.
10. Id. at 199-200.
11. Id. at 202 & n.13, 203-04 (stating that a statistical correlation of 2% between
maleness and drunk driving was insufficient to establish a statistically permissible
"fit" and "adequate justification" for regulation, and requiring that a greater accuracy
in serving the State's interest in reducing drunk driving be shown).
12. Id. at 203 n.16, 204 (ruling that women and men are similarly situated be-
cause "statistical disparities between the sexes are not substantial" in terms of alco-
hol consumption and driving, thus making the gender-based differential substantially
underinclusive. The ban on 18-20 year-old males only prohibited them from buying
beer, not from drinking beer, which made the statute even more underinclusive in
light of the important governmental interest of reducing teenage drunk driving).
13. Id. at 201-02 (banning all 18-20 year-old males from buying 3.2% beer in
order to reduce drunk driving, while statistics showed that only 2% of males in that
age group were arrested for drunk driving, represents an overinclusive statute. "[A]
correlation of 2% must be considered an unduly tenuous 'fit'."). Id.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 68-74.
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the relationship component has also begun to .differentiate the
underinclusiveness inquiry from the service inquiry.' Finally,
the Court has begun to distinguish clearly between the interme-
diate review service test of "substantially" or "materially" serv-
ing the government's important interests and the strict scrutiny
service test, which in addition requires the statute "directly"
serve the government's compelling interests. 6
Ultimately, the end result of this elaboration should be ex-
plicit acknowledgement of two separate levels at heightened
scrutiny for each of the three legislative fit inquiries: (1) "mate-
rially advancing an important (or substantial or significant)
governmental interest" versus "materially advancing a compel-
ling governmental interest" for the advancement inquiry;' (2)
a "substantial relationship" test versus a "direct relationship"
test for the underinclusiveness and service inquiries;' and (3)
a "narrowly drawn" versus "least restrictive alternative" test for
the overinclusiveness and restrictiveness inquiries."
Regarding the question of legislative fit and the various ver-
sions of rational review, minimum rationality review only re-
quires a minimally rational relationship, rationally (i.e., "mini-
mally" or "marginally") advancing a legitimate interest, and no
less restrictive alternative analysis. ° This inquiry takes place
against a backdrop of strong deference to legislative judg-
ments."' In basic rational review and rational review with bite,
15. See infra text accompanying notes 39-57.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 50-67.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 43-44, 50-67.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 70-77, 89-91. Regarding the various ver-
sions of heightened scrutiny, at basic mid-level review, applicable to cases like gender
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court applies the important
government interest, substantial relationship, and narrowly drawn legislative fit inqui-
ries. See infra text accompanying notes 33, 44, 50, 74. At mid-level review with bite,
used in cases such as those involving commercial speech, the Court applies the im-
portant governmental interest and narrowly drawn inquiries, but then adds to those
requirements the direct relationship requirement of strict scrutiny. See infra text
accompanying notes 56, 60-67, 75-76. At strict scrutiny, the Court applies the compel-
ling governmental interest, direct relationship, and least restrictive alternative legisla-
tive fit test. See infra text accompanying notes 34, 45, 51, 55, 71-73. On these three
heightened standards of review generally, see Kelso, supra note 2, at 504-08, 586-91.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 32, 42, 46, 87.
21. See also TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1442-43 ("The traditional deference both to
legislative purpose and to legislative selections among means continues, on the whole,
12831994]
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this extreme deference to legislative judgments is dropped, and
the Court will consider on its own whether there is a rational
relationship between means and ends and a rational advance-
ment. Furthermore, the Court will apply a version of the re-
strictiveness and overinclusiveness inquiries that I have previ-
ously denominated a "weak" less restrictive alternative test.'
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE ADVANCEMENT, RELATIONSHIP,
AND BURDEN INQUIRIES
The most well-developed doctrinal approach to issues of legis-
lative fit between means and ends has occurred in Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Clause analysis of the benefits and
burdens of a particular legislative scheme. From Equal Protec-
tion Clause doctrine, questions arise as to what extent the
statute is underinclusive in the way it achieves its benefits or
overinclusive in the way it distributes its burdens.' From Due
to make the [minimum] rationality requirement largely equivalent to a strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality."). See generally Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642-43,
2648 (1993) (discussing the elements of minimum rationality review, and emphasizing
the deference due to legislative judgment under rational review).
22. The heightened rational review relationship inquiry is discussed infra at notes
43, 47-49 and accompanying text. The "weak" less restrictive alternative test is dis-
cussed infra at notes 78-86 and accompanying text. As described in a previous article,
the difference between basic rational review and rational review with bite is that at
basic rational review the challenger has the burden of demonstrating that the chal-
lenged conduct is unconstitutional. At rational review with bite, the burden shifts to
the government to demonstrate that its action is constitutional. For a discussion of
cases where the burden has shifted to the government to establish the constitutional-
ity of its action, see Kelso, supra note 2, at 499-504. Compare direct discrimination
against interstate commerce cases under dormant Commerce Clause analysis in Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, (1986) and cases involving the First Amendment rights of
government workers to speak on matters of public concern, Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378, 388 (1987) with cases where the challenger still has the burden of proof,
such as cases of indirect discrimination on interstate commerce under Pike v. Bruce
Church, 397 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1970) and cases involving the government substantially
impairing the obligation of its own contracts under the Contract Clause, Energy Re-
serves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412-13 (1983). For a
recent example under heightened rational review of the Court placing the burden on
the government, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2318-20 (1994). This
holding was vigorously questioned by the four dissenting Justices. Id. at 2323, 2326
(Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun & Ginsburg, J.J., dissenting); id. at 2331 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
23. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 572:
An under-inclusive classification contains all similarly situated people but
excludes some people who are similar to them in terms of the purpose of
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Process Clause doctrine, there are issues regarding the extent
of the benefits achieved under the statute and whether the
burden on the regulated individual is simply too great given
these benefits.' Under free speech doctrine, the Supreme
Court has struggled with questions of legislative fit in cases
involving commercial speech25 and in cases distinguishing be-
tween content-neutral and content-based restrictions on
speech.'
For example, in commercial speech cases, the Court has stat-
ed explicitly that two basic issues frame the "fit" inquiry.'
These two issues involve how to define the phrase "directly
advance" under the third prong of the Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission test, and how to de-
fine the phrase "not more extensive than necessary" under the
the law.... A law may be said to be over-inclusive when the legislative
classification includes all persons who are similarly situated in terms of
the law plus an additional group of persons.
Id. (footnote omitted).
24. See generally TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1306:
The inquiry must examine likely results.... [Intrusions must be mea-
sured for their necessity and efficacy, and if the intrusions are extreme
alternatives must be considered. In each case, it will be necessary to ask:
Who is being hurt? Who benefits? By what process is the rule imposed?
For what reasons? With what likely effect as precedent?
Id. (Footnote omitted).
25. Modern commercial speech doctrine began in 1976. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In 1980, the
Court set forth a four-part test to be used in commercial speech cases in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
For commercial speech to come within [the protection of the First
Amendment], [1] it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
leading. Next, we ask [2] whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
[3] whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest as-
serted, and [4] whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.
Id.
26. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
477-80 (1989) (comparing the "least restrictive alternative" test used at strict scrutiny
with the "looser" less restrictive alternative test of intermediate review for content-
neutral time, place, or manner regulations of speech); Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 798 n.6 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (strict scrutiny
applied to a content-based regulation of speech).
27. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328,
341 (1986) ("The last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve a
consideration of the 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to ac-
complish those ends.").
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fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.'I A third issue, ad-
dressed by the second prong of the Central Hudson test is the
question of what level of government interests are required to
be advanced by the regulation.' All three of these prongs are
part of a proper legislative fit analysis. °
A. The Advancement Inquiry
The first inquiry under the three-part "legislative fit" analysis
concerns what types of interests the legislature must advance
in passing its statute."' Under current doctrine, rational re-
view requires that legitimate or permissible governmental inter-
ests be advanced.32 At intermediate review, important, sub-
stantial or significant governmental interests need to be ad-
vanced.' At strict scrutiny, the statute must advance compel-
28. 447 U.S. at 564 (1980). For the Central Hudson test reproduced in full, see
supra note 25.
29. 447 U.S. at 564. The Central Hudson test requires that the regulation ad-
vance a substantial government interest. Id.
30. The first prong of the Central Hudson test asks whether the government is
regulating illegal or misleading commercial speech. Id. In such a case, no further
review takes place under commercial speech analysis, and the challenger is left with
only a claim under the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause. See id. at 563-64.
31. The same analysis applies if it is an administrative agency adopting a rule
pursuant to delegated rule-making authority, or the President passing an executive
order. More broadly, the question is what interests the relevant governmental entity
is trying to advance in undertaking the action under review by the court. See gener-
ally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 452 ("When a legislature, executive official,
or a court takes some official action against an individual, that action is subjected to
review under the Constitution."). Id. at 568 ("The equal protection guarantee ...
governs all governmental actions.") (emphasis added). For ease of reference, through-
out this article reference is typically made only to the paradigm case of a court re-
viewing legislative action in passing a statute.
32. The Court has occasionally spoken in terms of "permissible" interests. See
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196
(1964). The more common phrasing, however, and the phrasing used in the remainder
of this article, is "legitimate" governmental interests. See TRIBE, supra note 1, at
1439-40.
33. In various opinions the Court has used the terms "important," "substantial" or
"significant" to describe the level of governmental interests required at intermediate
review. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984) (requiring "significant" governmental ends in a case involving a content-neutral
time, place, or manner regulation of speech); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (1980)
(requiring "substantial" governmental ends in a case involving commercial speech);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (requiring "important" governmental inter-
ests in a case involving gender discrimination). For a discussion of these three cases
as representative of intermediate review (either basic mid-level review or mid-level re-
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ling or overriding governmental interests.3 If the statute un-
der review does not advance this level of interest, the statute
will be held unconstitutional, without consideration of the re-
maining two prongs of the legislative fit analysis. Furthermore,
if the statute only advances impermissible interests, the statute
will be held unconstitutional even at minimum rationality re-
view.'
In determining which governmental interests can be used to
support the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, the
Court has indicated that in applying rational review it will
consider whether "any conceivable set of facts ... provide[s] a
rational basis for the classification.""6 In cases applying inter-
mediate scrutiny, the standard is whether any government
interest "put forward by the State" is a substantial governmen-
tal interest.37 Finally, in applying strict scrutiny, the Court
view with bite), see supra note 7 and infra notes 58, 74 and accompanying text.
Because it mirrors the nature of the relationship required under intermediate
scrutiny, see infra text accompanying notes 44, 50, 51, the term "substantial" govern-
mental interest is used in the remainder of this article to describe the requisite gov-
ernmental interest which must be advanced at intermediate review.
34. The Court has occasionally used the term "overriding" to describe the nature
of the governmental interest required under strict scrutiny. See e.g., United States v.
Lea, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982). The more common term, however, and the term used
in the remainder of this article, is "compelling" governmental interest. See generally
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 530.
35. For a few examples of "impermissible" governmental interests, see Oregon
Waste Sys. Inc., v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1354 (1994) (stat-
ing that it is impermissible under dormant Commerce Clause analysis for a state to
engage in economic protectionism); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1989) (hold-
ing that a court may not take private biases against interracial marriage into account
in child custody decisions); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1982) (stating that
Alaska may not base its oil revenue dividend distribution plan on time of residency
in the state in order to reward long-time residents for past contributions to the
state); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (holding that
a university may not increase the number of minority medical students solely for the
purpose of increasing the percentage of minority medical students).
36. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commu-
nications, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993)); see Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993)
(limiting the "any conceivable interest" test to rational basis review and rejecting its
use at intermediate scrutiny); see generally Kelso, supra note 2, at 535-36 (discussing
use of the "any conceivable interest" standard in cases involving rational review).
37. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1798 (1993). This aspect of intermediate review is dis-
cussed more fully in R. Randall Kelso, Three Years Hence: An Update on Filling Gaps
in the Supreme Court's Approach to Constitutional Review of Legislation, 36 S. TEx.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1995).
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will only consider whether the "actual purposes" of the govern-
ment advance compelling governmental interests."
B. The Relationship Inquiry Regarding Statutory Benefits
The relationship inquiry of legislative fit analysis involves
two related parts. First, there is the issue of whether the stat-
ute fails to regulate some individuals who are part of the prob-
lem. This is the underinclusiveness inquiry.39 Second, there is
the issue of the extent to which the statute achieves its benefits
over those whom it does not properly regulate. This is the ser-
vice inquiry.'
Underinclusiveness occurs when one group is singled out to
be the solution for a problem despite other similarly situated
groups who are also part of the problem.4' Minimum rationali-
38. See generally Kelso, supra note 2, at 535-36 (discussing strict scrutiny); see,
e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
762-67 (1986), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2800 (1992) (stating it was an illegitimate actual purpose for the legislature to deter
women from exercising their right of choice regarding abortion); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987) (holding it was an illegitimate actual purpose of the legisla-
ture to advance religion). In some earlier cases, the Court appeared to adopt the
"actual purpose" test for cases involving intermediate review. See Kelso, supra note 2,
at 536 n.233. However, the Court noted in the 1993 Fane decision that when dealing
with an intermediate review case, it would not turn the case away "if it appears that
the stated interests are not the actual interests served by the restriction." Fane, 113
S. Ct. at 1798 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730
(1982)). The language in Fane clearly indicates that the Court has rejected the "actu-
al purpose" test for intermediate review, and will apply it only in cases of strict
scrutiny.
39. The phrase "underinclusiveness" is drawn from the Equal Protection Clause.
See infra text and accompanying notes 41-44.
40. The phrase "service inquiry" is drawn from cases such as Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980), where the Court has stated that part of the
legislative fit inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause is whether the "discriminato-
ry means employed" in the case "substantially serve the statutory end." Id. at 151;
see infra text accompanying notes 45-55. It should be noted that the following dis-
cussion of relationship and burden under equal protection, due process, and free
speech doctrine represents an expanded discussion of the relationship and burden
analysis under commercial speech doctrine which appears in Kelso, supra note 37, at
nn.101-33.
41. See TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1447. "Underinclusive classifications do not in-
dude all who are similarly situated with respect to a rule, and thereby burden less
than would be logical to achieve the intended governmental end." Id. As Professor
Tribe further notes,
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ty review tolerates underinclusiveness because of the strong
presumption of deference to the government under this test.
42
However, this is not true at heightened rational review, inter-
mediate review, or strict scrutiny. At heightened rational re-
view, the Court will not defer to the government's finding that
whatever underinclusiveness exists is the product of a rational
governmental choice. Rather, the Court will independently de-
termine whether the extent of the statute's underinclusiveness
means that the statute is not rationally related to legitimate
governmental ends.' At intermediate review, the Court asks
[Jludicial tolerance of underinclusiveness may well invite legislatures to
avoid the full political consequences of their actions, for "nothing opens
the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow . . . officials to pick
and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to
escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger
numbers were affected."
Id. at 1447-48 (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)). On the other hand:
In defense of underinclusiveness it has been argued that piecemeal legis-
lation is a pragmatic means of effecting needed reforms, where a demand
for completeness may lead to total paralysis: 'The State [is] not bound to
deal alike with all .. . classes, or to strike at all evils at the same. time
or in the same way."
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1447 (quoting Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examin-
ers, 294 U.S. 608 (1935)).
42. See generally TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1447; supra note 21 and accompanying
text. For example, in the classic minimum rationality review case of Railway Express
Agency, 336 U.S. at 109-10, a New York law banned advertisements for hire on the
side of trucks, ostensibly to prevent distraction to motorists and pedestrians from
increasing traffic safety problems. However, the state did not ban advertisements on
the side of trucks for the trucker's own company. Because the case pre-dated develop-
ment of the commercial speech doctrine in 1976, see supra note 25, it involved only
minimum rationality review, and thus the underinclusiveness of the statutory scheme
did not raise any serious constitutional problems. While strongly deferring to the local
government's judgment, the Court observed that:
[tihe local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise
their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem
in view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they use. It
would take a degree of omniscience which we lack to say that such is
not the case.... And the fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate
from traffic this kind of distraction but does not touch what may be even
greater ones in a different category, such as the vivid displays on Times
Square, is immaterial. It is no requirement of equal protection [minimum
rationality review] that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none
at all.
Id. at 110.
43. See generally TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1444 (discussing rational review of a
more penetrating nature); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 580-85; Gerald
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the more stringent question of whether the statute, even if
rationally related to its ends, is or is not substantially
underinclusive.' Under strict scrutiny, no unnecessary
underinclusiveness is permitted."
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
of New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) ("[Tihese cases found bite in the
equal protection clause after explicitly voicing the traditional toothless minimum ratio-
nality standard."). Id. at 18-19.
Thus, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985),
the Court did not defer to the government's judgment, but concluded for itself that
the statute's underinclusiveness was not rational when the statute did not permit the
construction of a home for the mentally retarded. The statute was based upon: (1)
the safety concerns of the home being built on a "five hundred year flood plain" and
possible problems with evacuation in the event of a flood, but did permit nursing
homes, homes for the convalescents or the aged, which raised the same kind of evac-
uation concerns; (2) a concern with the number of people who might occupy it, but
did permit the existence of other kinds of homes or houses, which raised similar
occupancy concerns; (3) concerns of legal responsibility for actions which the inhabit-
ants might take, but did permit boarding and fraternity houses, which raised similar
concerns regarding legal responsibility. Id. at 449-50. Similarly, in Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 248, (1978), the Court did not defer to the
government's judgment, but concluded that the statute was terribly underinclusive in
applying
only to private employers who have at least 100 employees, at least one
of whom works in Minnesota, and who have established voluntary pen-
sion plans, qualified under § 401 of the Internal Revenue Code. And it
applies only when such an employer closes his Minnesota office or termi-
nates his pension plan.
Id. This determination was critically important in terms of the Court's finding that
the statute was not "reasonable," that is, not rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernment end. So, too, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2318-22 (1994), the
Court rejected a minimum rationality review level of scrutiny, and required a higher
"reasonable relationship" or "rough proportionality" standard where the "nature and
extent" of the regulation's benefits and burdens would be balanced by the Court.
For a general discussion of heightened rational review in Equal Protection, Due
Process, Contract Clause, Takings Clause, and constitutional adjudications generally,
see Kelso, supra note 2, at 499-504, 519-21, 553 n.353, 585-99; supra note 22 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of heightened rational review and the service
component of the relationship inquiry, see infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of heightened rational review under the legislative fit burden analy-
sis, see infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) (stating that
a statutory rape law applicable only to men is not substantially underinclusive be-
cause teenage men are not similarly situated as teenage women with regard to the
risk of teenage pregnancy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 203 n.16, 204 (1976) (ruling
that gender-based differential in terms of who can buy 3.2% beer is unconstitutional,
in part because "statistical disparities between the sexes are not substantial" in terms
of alcohol consumption and driving, and thus women and men are similarly situated,
making the gender-based differential substantially underinclusive).
45. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (quoting McLaughlin
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The second relationship inquiry, the service inquiry, which is
concerned with the extent to which the statute serves its
intended ends, also involves a tiered approach among minimum
rationality review, heightened rational review, intermediate
review, and strict scrutiny. At minimum rationality review, the
statute need only marginally, or minimally, serve to advance
the government's ends. At this level of scrutiny, the Court
defers to the legislature's judgment concerning whether such
marginal service exists." In contrast, at heightened rational
review (whether basic rational review or rational review with
bite), the Court does not defer to the government's judgment
but examines for itself whether such marginal service exists.'
For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.," the Court did not defer to the legislature's judgment
concerning the rationality of the legislative scheme, but it rath-
er determined for itself "whether the policies hypothesized to
save the challenged action were actually supported by fact."4"
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) ([R]acial classifications "must be justified by a
compelling government interest and must be necessary ... to the accomplishment of
their legitimate purpose.")); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("[Rlacial classi-
fications.... if they are ever to be upheld .... must be shown to be necessary to
the accomplishment of some permissible state objective."); see generally NOWAK & RO-
TUNDA, supra note 1, at 575 ("If the justices are of the opinion that the classification
need not be employed to achieve such an end, the law will be held to violate the
equal protection guarantee.").
46. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("It is
enough that there was an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought
that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."); supra notes
20-21 and accompanying text; see also DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTrrUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 293-96 (1993) (discussing vari-
ous formulations of rational review, including the view that minimum rationality
requires only that the statute not be "arbitrary [or capricious]", "ridiculous", or passed
by "babbling idiots").
47. See generally TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1444 (discussing rational review of a
more penetrating nature); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 580-85; Gunther,
supra note 43, at 18-19 ("[T]hese cases found bite in the equal protection clause after
explicitly voicing the traditional toothless minimum rationality standard.").
48. 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985).
49. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1444; see also Kelso, supra note 2, at 500 n.27, 501
n.30, citing, inter alia, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
458-59 (1985) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (noting
that the majority applied "second-order" rational review); Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct.
2637, 2652-53 (1993) (Souter, J., joined by Blackmun, Stevens, & O'Connor, JJ., dis-
senting) (chastising the majority for improperly applying Cleburne in a case involving
regulations concerning the mentally impaired).
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At intermediate review, the statute must substantially serve
the governmental ends." Under strict scrutiny, the statute
must not only substantially serve the governmental ends, but
do so directly."'
The same level of non-deferential rational basis scrutiny also appears in other
areas of constitutional law, like dormant Commerce Clause analysis, Contract Clause
analysis, or analysis under the Takings Clause.
For example, when examining legislation under the dormant Commerce Clause,
the Court independently examines whether the state is advancing legitimate interests
"unrelated to economic protectionism." See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Oregon Dep't of
Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1354 (1994). Similarly, under the Contract Clause,
where the state is impairing the obligation of either its own contracts or a narrow
range of contract actors, the Court does not defer to legislative judgment. See Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412-13 n.14 (1983);
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 243-44 (1978). Likewise, under
Takings Clause doctrine, the Court does not defer to the legislature's judgment under
the recently developed "essential nexus" test in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct.
2309, 2317-18 (1994). For further discussion of heightened rational review and the
dormant Commerce Clause and Contract Clause, see Kelso, supra note 2, at 501-04,
519-21. For further discussion of Dolan, see Kelso, supra note 37, at nn.48-71 and
accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) (stat-
ing that in a gender discrimination case involving intermediate review under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court considers whether the "discriminatory means em-
ployed" in the case "substantially serve[s] the statutory end"); Carey v. Population
Sel-v. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 695 (1977) (explaining that in a substantive due process
case, the Court will ask whether there is a "substantial reason" to support the
government's contention that the ban on a minor's access to contraceptives would
serve the state's interest). Though the Court has never explicitly held that the stan-
dard of review in Carey represents intermediate review, the Carey Court did note
that something less than strict scrutiny was being applied. Additionally, the Carey
opinion tracks an intermediate standard of review in all of its aspects. See Kelso,
supra note 2, at 528-29.
51. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-86 (1990)
(ruling that "heightened evidentiary requirements" concerning a surrogate's cision
whether an incompetent patient would want life-supporting treatment removed was
directly related to the state's compelling interest in the protection and preservation of
human life); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 212-13 (1986) (Blackmun, J., joined
by Brennan, Marshall, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (applying a strict scrutiny approach
rejected by the majority, the dissent noted that the state's interest in "protecting the
public environment" was not directly served by banning private consensual sexual re-
lationships of which the public might disapprove); Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-66 (1986), overruled in part by
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2800 (1992) (stating that "reporting
requirements" under Pennsylvania abortion regulation law was not directly related to
"the health-related interests" that serve to justify the regulation).
Although the Court has not been perfectly clear on this point, it is clear from
the commercial speech cases that a direct relationship, not merely a substantial rela-
tionship, is required at strict scrutiny review. As the Court noted in United States v.
Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2705 (1993), commercial speech cases involve a
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It is arguable whether this "service" inquiry should apply in
equal protection cases. 2 However, it is clear that under cur-
rent equal protection analysis, the question of "service," as well
as the question of "underinclusiveness," is part of intermediate
and strict scrutiny review. For example, in Wengler v. Druggists
Mutual Insurance Co.,' which involved intermediate scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court considered wheth-
er the "discriminatory means employed" in the case "substan-
tially serve[d] the statutory end."' 4 The difference between the
intermediate scrutiny "substantial service" test and the strict
scrutiny "direct relationship" requirement is also apparent in
equal protection cases. For example, under the strict scrutiny
approach towards state affirmative action programs, only reme-
less rigorous form of scrutiny than traditional First Amendment content-based regula-
tions. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (content-based restrictions are
subject to "most exacting scrutiny"). Since it is clear that a "direct relationship" re-
quirement is applied in commercial speech cases, see infra notes 58-67 and accom-
panying text, a fortiori such a requirement, not the more lax requirement of a mere
"substantial relationship", must be required at strict scrutiny.
52. It must be noted that under a "pristine" Equal Protection Clause analysis, the
Court should perhaps restrict its inquiry to the underinclusiveness or
overinclusiveness of the statute, and reserve for substantive due process review the
question of how much the statute achieves ("serves") its ends or oppressively burdens
individuals (the "restrictiveness" inquiry). In theory, a statute which is neither
underinclusive nor overinclusive, but which only minimally serves the government's
interest, or greatly burdens individuals, does not deny a citizen equal protection of
the laws, because the law is applied equally to all similarly situated parties. It may,
however, deny the citizen substantive due process if the burden on the individual is
sufficiently great compared to the minimal benefit that is achieved.
Practically speaking, this theoretical difference is of little importance provided
the standards of review under the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause
are the same. Thus, as long as burdens on suspect classes or fundamental rights
trigger strict scrutiny analysis under both the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses, the issues of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness, and of balancing
benefits and burdens, will both be considered at the same level of review. Whether
the analysis is under equal protection, due process, or a combination, makes little
difference. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 568-70, 578-80, 757-816
(noting the similarity between equal protection and substantive due process review,
and discussing an entire range of fundamental rights cases, including the due pro-
cess-based right of privacy and right to die cases, under the chapter heading of equal
protection). Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Court has occasionally not sepa-
rated Equal Protection Clause analysis from Due Process Clause analysis. See, e.g.,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391-92, 395-96 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the majority's equal protection analysis is really substantive due
process analysis in disguise).
53. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
54. Id at 151.
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dial steps "directly related" to remedying prior discrimination
against individuals are constitutional.55 In contrast, under the
intermediate review approach to federal affirmative action pro-
grams as enunciated in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,' an
indirect means of encouraging broadcasting diversity by adopt-
ing a preference for minority ownership satisfied the substantial
service component of intermediate review.'
A similar tiered approach is employed in cases involving the
freedom of speech. This approach is clearest in cases involving
the commercial speech doctrine where the term "directly ad-
vance" in Central Hudson reflects the strict scrutiny concern
with the way the statute's benefits are achieved.' While the
Court has not been perfectly clear on the point, in traditional
free speech cases the Court has basically applied intermediate
scrutiny to content-neutral regulations of speech and strict
scrutiny to content-based regulations of speech.59
With respect to commercial speech, the Court recently clari-
fied the meaning of the phrase "directly advance" under the
55. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-11 (1989).
As the Croson Court noted, a state or local entity may take steps 'to rectify the
effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdiction' if the remedial relief is
tailored "to those who truly have suffered the effects of prior discrimination." Id. at
508. In contrast, indirect means to remedy prior discrimination, such as role model
approaches, are unconstitutional under the Croson strict scrutiny approach. Id. at
497-98.
56. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
57. Id. at 579-84.
58. It is precisely because the Central Hudson test adopted the strict scrutiny
term for describing the required relationship that I described the Central Hudson test
as mid-level review "with bite," rather than basic mid-level review in my article three
years ago. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 505-06, 577-78. The "bite" to Central Hudson is
the application of a strict scrutiny direct relationship component to an otherwise basic
mid-level test. Id. For a further discussion of this "direct" relationship test in Central
Hudson, see infra text accompanying notes 60-67.
59. Compare Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 & n.6 (1989)
(applying the intermediate scrutiny "substantial relationship" test in the context of a
content-neutral regulation of speech by concluding that "[glovernment may not regu-
late expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech
does not serve to advance its goals") with Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-29 (1988)
(indicating that strict scrutiny review is appropriate for a content-based regulation of
speech in a public forum); see generally Kelso, supra note 2, at 558-78, 590-91. Of
course, this analysis concerns speech in a public forum. The regulation of speech in a
non-public forum is subject to different, and less rigorous, standards of review. This
review is more akin to a version of rational review, unless viewpoint discrimination is
involved, which would trigger strict scrutiny. See id. at 578-82.
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Central Hudson test. In 1993, the Court rejected an interpreta-
tion of "directly advance" that would have analyzed only wheth-
er the statute serves to advance its ends in a direct causal way,
even if the statute only minimally or marginally serves to ad-
vance its ends.' This approach reflects more of a rational re-
view service inquiry. Instead, the Court held in Edenfield v.
Fane that the "directly advance" prong of the Central Hudson
test requires a "direct and material" advancement of the state's
interest.6' As the discussion in Fane makes clear, the term
"material" in this context is the equivalent of the term "sub-
stantial." '2 Thus, as in the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clause contexts, in the commercial speech context, "direct ad-
vancement" under the service inquiry requires both "substantial
service" and a "direct relationship."'
60. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800-02 (1993). This limitation of the
term "direct" to a direct causal relationship was the position espoused by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1523
(1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded in Discovery Network that Central Hudson's third prong could be
satisfied merely by the government advancing its interests, even "marginally," in a
direct causal way, without any additional "material" or "substantial" advancement re-
quirement. Id. For a discussion of "marginal" or "minimal" advancement as meeting
the rational review service inquiry, see supra text accompanying notes 46-49. Howev-
er, this view represented the dissent in Discovery Network. The majority opinion in
Discovery Network noted that the ban on commercial newspaper dispensers on public
sidewalks, of which there were 62, while permitting regular newspaper dispensers on
sidewalks, of which there were 1,500-2,000, achieved only a "marginal degree of pro-
tection," which helped to render the statute not sufficiently related to its intended
ends to pass constitutional scrutiny. 113 S. Ct. at 1510, 1514-15.
61. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1800-02.
62. See, e.g., id. at 1801-02 ("TIhe prohibitions here do not serve these purposes
in a direct and material manner. Where a restriction on speech lacks this close and
substantial relation to the governmental interests asserted, it cannot be, by definition,
a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.").
63. For discussion of the strict scrutiny dual requirement of "substantial service"
and a "direct relationship" under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, see
supra notes 51, 55 and accompanying text. Though Justice Kennedy's opinion in Fane
commanded eight votes, it is far from clear that each of these Justices agreed that
this dual requirement is appropriate in cases involving commercial speech. As noted
supra note 60, the Discovery Network dissent disagreed with this analysis. However,
this leaves a majority of five votes for Justice Kennedy's opinion in Fane on this
point.
The majority opinion of Justice White in United States v. Edge Broadcasting,
113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) does not undercut the vitality of the Fane analysis. Reflecting
the view he took in Discovery Network, Justice White noted in Edge, 'The interests of
lottery and non-lottery states are directly served ... and this would plainly be the
case even if, as applied to Edge, there were only marginal advancement of that inter-
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Moreover, as in the Equal Protection and Due Process con-
texts, the requirement of a "direct" relationship in cases involv-
ing commercial speech adds some rigor to the intermediate
"substantial" service requirement. This fact is discussed in Jus-
tice O'Connor's dissent in Fane. Justice O'Connor noted that
there exists "profound" concern regarding the image of the legal
and accounting professions because of the "incremental, indi-
rect" effects of commercialization." However, Justice O'Connor
noted that Central Hudson permits states to target only "direct"
harms to the listener, and thus "directly advance" governmental
interests, while preventing regulation dealing with such "indi-
rect" harms.65
The term "direct advancement" under commercial speech
doctrine also reflects a heightened scrutiny concern that a stat-
ute not be unnecessarily underinclusive. In his dissent in City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., Chief Justice
est." Id. at 2704. However, this quote is dicta for two reasons. First, the Court held
that, in any event, as applied to Edge Broadcasting, the government "may be said to
advance its purpose by substantially reducing lottery advertising." Id. at 2707. Thus,
a "substantial" or "material" advancement of the government interest was present in
Edge. Second, even if there were only marginal advancement as applied to Edge, it
would be an open question whether the "direct and material" standard of Fane should
be applied to the effects on the particular challenger before the Court or applied to
all individuals. See id. at 2708 (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring) (leaving
that question open). Thus, the definition of "directly related" in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Discovery Network seems to be just that, a dissent.
64. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1804 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
65. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that in her view, contrary to current commercial
speech analysis under Central Hudson, states should have the authority under the
commercial speech doctrine "to prohibit commercial speech that, albeit not directly
harmful to the listener, is inconsistent with the speaker's membership in a learned
profession .... Commercialization has an incremental, indirect, yet profound effect on
professional culture, as lawyers know all too well." Id. Such speech could possibly be
regulated under the substantial relationship test of basic mid-level review but cannot
be regulated under a "direct relationship" requirement because no regulation can
directly respond to such an indirect effect. As Justice O'Connor's fiustration with the
current commercial speech doctrine reflects, a "direct relationship" requirement, such
as in Central Hudson, means that the government can only respond to "direct
harms," such as advertising which are "false or misleading, or amount to 'overreach-
ing, invasion of privacy, [or] exercise of undue influence." Id. (quoting Shapiro v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 486 U.S. 466, 478 (1988)); see also Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of
Business & Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994) (holding that a commer-
cial speech regulation of certified public accountants was not directly related to regu-
lating misleading advertising- Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor dissented
in part, claiming that the regulation was directly related to preventing misleading
advertising.).
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Rehnquist suggested an interpretation of "direct" that would
have allowed the government to satisfy the "direct advance"
requirement of Central Hudson by adopting a mere direct caus-
al relationship, even if the statute were terribly
underinclusive.' The majority, however, rejected this interpre-
tation and signaled that the direct relationship requirement
under Central Hudson embodies a heightened scrutiny
underinclusiveness inquiry.'1
66. See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1523 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by
White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting), discussed supra note 60. Under this view, an in-
credibly underinclusive scheme could still be directly related. For example, under this
view the ban on advertisements on the side of trucks for hire in the classic pre-Cen-
tral Hudson commercial speech case of Railway Express v. New York, discussed supra
note 42, would likely be found to be a direct causal link to traffic safety. If so, that
would permit the minimum rationality test of allowing the legislature broad discretion
to deal with one part of the problem at a time, to control under the Central Hudson
test. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's similar possible attempt to "water down" other aspects of com-
mercial speech doctrine to mirror rational review, see Donald E. Lively, The Supreme
Court and Commercial Speech: New Words with an Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REv.
289, 299-304 (1987).
67. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510 n.13. In Discovery Network, the majori-
ty noted that banning commercial newspaper dispensers on public sidewalks while
permitting regular newspaper dispensers on sidewalks was too underinclusive in re-
sponse to the problem of "unattractive or "eyesore" newsracks. Id. at 1510, 1514-15.
Whether this heightened scrutiny underinclusiveness requirement is the intermediate
level of substantial underinclusiveness or the strict scrutiny requirement of unneces-
sary underinclusiveness is in some doubt. The language in Discovery Network seems
to adopt the "substantial underinclusiveness" analysis poised between rational basis
review and strict scrutiny. Id. at 1510 n.13. However, based upon the requirement of
a "direct" relationship, logically, it should be a strict scrutiny underinclusiveness in-
quiry. Of course, the Central Hudson test clearly adopts an intermediate level of scru-
tiny for the advancement inquiry (requiring only a substantial governmental interest).
See supra note 24. Similarly, it adopts an intermediate level of scrutiny for burden
analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 75-77 (rejecting the strict scrutiny "least
restrictive alternative" analysis in cases involving commercial speech). To the extent
that the underinclusiveness inquiry in Central Hudson only adopts a substantial
underinclusiveness test, this would mean that the Central Hudson test adopts a strict
scrutiny level of review only for the service inquiry. See supra text accompanying
notes 60-65. On a related point, by not clearly separating these various inquiries from
one another, the Court has sometimes confused the strict scrutiny "direct relation-
ship" requirement and the intermediate review requirement of a "substantial relation-
ship" in some recent cases discussing the proper standard of review in commercial
speech and content-neutral time, place, or manner regulations of speech. See infra
text accompanying notes 99-110.
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C. Legislative Burdens and Various Versions of the Narrowly
Drawn/Less Restrictive Alternative Analysis
The third major aspect of the "fit" analysis focuses on the
burdens caused by governmental regulation. The Equal Protec-
tion Clause concern in this area is the problem of
overinclusiveness. An overinclusive statute burdens individuals
who are not part of a given problem and thus burdens individu-
als who could be free from regulation under a more carefully
crafted, less broadly drafted statute."a The Due Process Clause
concern relating to government regulation burdens is that a
statute can burden too greatly individuals who are properly
regulated, in light of both the benefits achieved and possible
alternatives which would also advance the government's inter-
ests with less burden on the individual.69 As with the relation-
ship inquiry, the Court has not separated equal protection and
due process concerns, and thus both overinclusiveness and re-
strictiveness are aspects of equal protection, substantive due
process, and free speech review. Under each of these analyses,
a statute is not "narrowly drawn" if it is too overinclusive or
68. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 572 ("A law may be said to be
over-inclusive when the legislative classification includes all persons who are similarly
situated in terms of the law plus an additional group of persons."); TRIBE, supra note
1, at 1450 & n.23 ("Because overinclusive classifications by definition burden some
who are not similarly situated with respect to the purposes of a rule, they may of
course be challenged as denying equal protection. Borrowing language ordinarily used
elsewhere, it could be said that less restrictive alternatives exist for overinclusive
classifications."); Professor Tribe has remarked,
[An overinclusive law may well burden a politically powerless group
which would have been spared if it had enough clout to compel normal
attention to the relevant costs and benefits.... But as in the case of
underinclusiveness, it has been argued with success . . . that legislative
resort to somewhat overinclusive classifications is legitimate as a prophy-
lactic device to insure the achievement of statutory ends: 'We must re-
member that the machinery of government would not work if it were not
allowed a little play in its joints.'
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1449-50 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
69. See generally TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1306
("The inquiry must examine likely results.... [I]ntrusions must be mea-
sured for their necessity and efficacy, and if the intrusions are extreme
alternatives must be considered. In each case, it will be necessary to ask.
Who is being hurt? Who benefits? By what process is the rule imposed?
For what reasons? With what likely effect as precedent?").
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too burdensome on individuals, given the benefits to be
achieved and the availability of less restrictive alternatives.70
This "narrowly drawn" analysis is applied differently at strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, heightened rationality review,
and minimum rationality review. At strict scrutiny, the statute
must be the "least restrictive" alternative under the
restrictiveness analysis7  and must have no unnecessary
overinclusiveness pursuant to the overinclusiveness inquiry.72
70. The Court's most recent restatement of this "narrowly drawn" analysis ap-
pears in Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). In Turner,
the Court discussed as part of the intermediate "narrowly drawn" analysis the vari-
ous factual findings concerning the actual burden on cable television operators caused
by cable television regulations to determine whether "substantially more speech
than... necessary" was being suppressed (the overinclusiveness inquiry). Id. at
2472. It considered also "the availability and efficacy of 'constitutionally acceptable
less restrictive means' of achieving the Government's asserted interests." (the re-
strictiveness inquiry) Id.
71. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
477-80 (1989) (discussing the "least restrictive alternative" test used at strict scrutiny
versus the "looser" less restrictive alternative test of intermediate review); Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 n.6 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-
29 (1988) (applying the most exacting strict scrutiny restrictiveness requirement);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986) (adopting the more
stringent restrictiveness inquiry for purposes of strict scrutiny review). As noted in
Wygant, not every possible alternative approach must be considered to determine
whether any less restrictive alternative exists. Rather, the Court will require the gov-
ernment to consider only those alternatives which promote the compelling governmen-
tal interest 'about as well and at tolerable administrative expense'." Id. at 480 n.6
(quoting Kent Greenwalt, Judicial Scrutiny of 'Benign' Racial Preference in Law
School Admissions, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 559, 578-79 (1975)).
72. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660-66
(1990). In Austin, the Court upheld a state regulation limiting the expenditure of
funds by corporations in political campaigns because the regulation was "precisely
targeted to eliminate the distortion caused by corporate spending." Id. at 660. The
Court stated,
[als we explained in the context of our discussions of whether the statute
was overinclusive .... or underinclusive .... the State's decision to
regulate only corporations is precisely tailored to serve the compelling
state interest of eliminating from the political process the corrosive effect
of political 'war chests' amassed with the aid of the legal advantage
given to corporations.
Id. at 666. The Court's discussion in Austin applied this "precise" tailoring require-
ment by explaining why each of the distinctions drawn by the statute was necessary
to accomplish the statute's purpose and thus was not unnecessarily overinclusive or
underinclusive to any extent. Id. at 660-66. Given this "precise tailoring" analysis, it
is clear that the Court in Austin adopted the strict scrutiny "no unnecessary
underinclusiveness" inquiry despite the Courts passing use of the phrase "substantial-
ly overinclusive, an intermediate level of the overinclusiveness inquiry that was ap-
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The Court has occasionally combined these requirements,
stating that the statute must be "necessary" to advance the
statute's ends.7"
At intermediate scrutiny, the Court does not require the
legislature to adopt the "least restrictive alternative" or "no
unnecessary overinclusiveness." Rather, reflecting intermediate
scrutiny's typical "substantial" level of rigor, the statute only
need be "narrowly drawn"-that is, not "substantially more bur-
densome" than necessary under the overinclusiveness inquiry,
and not too substantially burdensome under the restrictiveness
inquiry so that, as phrased under First Amendment law, the
regulation "leaves open ample alternative channels of communi-
cation. " '
parently used by the challengers in their brief to the Court. Id. at 661.
73. See, e.g., Fox, 492 U.S. at 476-77 (noting that a strict interpretation of the
word "necessary" translates into the "least restrictive means" test); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("[Rlacial classifications.... if they are ever to be upheld....
must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state ob-
jective"); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 579 ('[strict scrutiny'...
requires a classification to be necessary . .. to a compelling or overriding governmen-
tal interest").
74. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2472 (1994) (holding that at
an intermediate review involving a content-neutral regulation of speech, the court
must consider the restrictiveness inquiry concerning "the availability and efficacy of
'constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means' of achieving the Government's as-
serted interests" and the overinclusiveness inquiry of whether the statute burdens
"substantially more speech" than "necessary"); Fox, 492 U.S. at 477-80 (discussing the
"least restrictive alternative" test used at strict scrutiny versus the "looser" less re-
strictive alternative test of intermediate review); Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 799 (holding
that narrow tailoring at intermediate scrutiny requires only that the means chosen do
not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's
[substantial] interests," (the overinclusiveness inquiry) and "leave open ample alterna-
tive channels of communication" (the restrictiveness inquiry) concerned with whether
the statute is too burdensome in failing to leave open ample alternative channels of
communication even as applied to those whom the state properly regulates); Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984) (applying the inter-
mediate review "narrowly drawn" analysis for content-neutral time, place, or manner
regulation of speech). Professor Kathleen Sullivan has referred to these two strands of
burden analysis as "the discrimination strand" (the overinclusiveness inquiry), and
"the distribution strand" (the oppressiveness or restrictiveness inquiry). Professor
Kathleen Sullivan, Address at the United States Law Week Annual Constitutional
Law Conference (Sept. 9-10, 1994). See Constitutional Law Scholars Assess Impact of
Supreme Court's 1993.94 Term, 63 U.S.L.W. 2229, 2239 (Oct. 18, 1994). The phrase
"close fit" has also been used to describe the required fit at intermediate review. See
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1603-04.
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By concluding that the "not more extensive than necessary"
language of Central Hudson's fourth prong reflects this "narrow-
ly drawn" analysis,75 the Court has united commercial speech
analysis with the similar "narrowly drawn" analysis under
equal protection, due process and standard First Amendment
law. In considering whether a statute is narrowly drawn under
Central Hudson, it is important to note that this analysis does
not require the least restrictive alternative, or no unnecessary
overinclusiveness, before the statute can be constitutional. The
only requirement is that the statute not be substantially
overbroad or substantially too burdensome given other possible
alternatives.76  The "least restrictive alternative" analysis,
which requires the least possible burden on those individuals
who are properly regulated and no overbreadth except for that
which is "necessary" to the furtherance of the government's
interest, is reserved for the "precise tailoring" standard of strict
scrutiny.7
For purposes of heightened rational review scrutiny, the
Court has adopted a requirement under the burden component
of the legislative fit analysis that I have referred to as a "weak"
less restrictive alternative test. 8 Reflecting the first burden
inquiry regarding overinclusiveness, this test asks whether the
government's interests could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on protected individual rights.7" Reflecting the second
75. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2704-06 (1993)
(citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 477-78).
76. See, e.g., Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2704-06 (citing Ward, 431 U.S. at
799). The majority in Ward held that narrow tailoring at intermediate scrutiny appli-
cable to commercial speech cases requires only that the means chosen do not "burden
substantially more speech than necessary to further the government's interests" and
"leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Ward, 431 U.S. at 799,
802.
77. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990)
("precise" targeting and "precise" tailoring required with no unnecessary
underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness present); Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 n.6 (discuss-
ing the difference between the "least restrictive alternative" analysis appropriate at
strict scrutiny versus the requirement of "narrow tailoring" applicable to intermediate
review); supra notes 71-73 (discussing use of the term "necessary" to describe this
strict scrutiny analysis).
78. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 499-500.
79. This test is a "weak" version of the less restrictive alternative analysis be-
cause unlike intermediate review or strict scrutiny, there is no independent "narrowly
drawn" or "least restrictive alternative" analysis that must be met. Rather, the con-
cern with the extent to which the statute is overinclusive takes place as part of an
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burden inquiry regarding restrictiveness, the Court requires
that the burdens the statute imposes must not be excessive in
relation to its benefits. This heightened rational review burden
analysis has been phrased in different ways under different
doctrines. For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,0 the Court noted that the statute was not well crafted
to advance whatever legitimate interests were conceivably pres-
ent in the case."l A dormant Commerce Clause analysis looks
to whether the burden on interstate commerce is "clearly exces-
sive" given the state's legitimate interests and the availability
of less restrictive alternatives. 2 Under' the Contract Clause,
the test is phrased as whether the impairment is "reasonable
and necessary."' Procedural due process analysis requires the
Court to consider whether "the private interests outweigh the
government's interests" under a scheme which deprives an in-
dividual of a liberty or property right." In Dolan v. City of
overall balance inquiry into the rationality of the legislature's action. The fact that
the government could have promoted its interests as well with a lesser impact on
individual rights is used to support the conclusion that the statute is not sufficiently
rationally related to the legitimate governmental ends. See id. at 499-500, 508 n.70.
80. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
81. Id. at 449-50. As Professor Tribe has noted, the Court implicitly considered in
Cleburne "how closely the state's actions were tailored to [its] policies." TRIBE, supra
note 1, at 1444.
82. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (asking whether the bur-
den imposed upon interstate commerce "is clearly excessive in relation to putative
local benefits," in part based upon whether the state's interests "could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities"); see also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S.
131, 138 (1986) (discussing whether the state's" burden on interstate commerce is
excessive in light of legitimate state interests and whether those interests "could not
be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means").
83. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1977) which
found:
We can only sustain the repeal of the . . . covenant if that impairment
was both reasonable and necessary .... [A] State is not free to impose a
drastic impairment when an evident and more moderate course would
serve its purposes equally as well.... [Thus, we] cannot conclude that
repeal of the covenant was reasonable in light of the surrounding circum-
stances.
84. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Under Mathews, the
Court balances:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally the Governmentfs interest, includ-
ing the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burden that
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Tigard, the Court discusses the Takings Clause doctrine.' The
Court's use of the phrase "rough proportionality" and the con-
sideration of whether the government's action transgressed the
"outer limits to how this may be done" tracks these similar
heightened rational review inquiries.' The only minimum ra-
tionality review requirement is that the statute's burden be
minimally rational and not arbitrary or capricious.'
Thus, the following four kinds of "fit" analysis emerge under
the burden inquiry of legislative fit analysis: (1) strict scrutiny:
"precise tailoring," "least restrictive alternative," or "necessary;"
(2) intermediate scrutiny (basic mid-level or mid-level review
with bite): "narrowly tailored," "narrowly drawn," "close fit," or
"does not burden substantially more speech than necessary;" (3)
heightened rational review (basic rational review or rational
review with bite): "reasonable fit," "rough proportionality," "rea-
sonable and necessary," or "not clearly excessive;" and (4) mini-
mum rationality: "minimally rational," "not arbitrary or capri-
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id.
85. 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2318-22 (1994).
86. Id. For example, a regulation will likely be held to be "roughly proportional"
as long as it is not "clearly excessive," as phrased under dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, or is "reasonable and necessary," as phrased under Contract Clause analysis.
As the Court noted in Dolan, the phrase "rough proportionality" is used to make it
clear that the "reasonableness" requirement in this context is more stringent than the
"rationality" requirement under minimum rationality review. Id. at 2319-20. For fur-
ther discussion of Dolan as representing heightened rational review, see Kelso, supra
note 37, at nn.48-71.
The possible confusion between the "reasonableness" and "minimum rationality"
requirements would be alleviated if the Court adopted the six-standard approach of
my previous article. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 498-504, 585-89. That approach delin-
eates clearly among the various kinds of rational review-minimum rationality review,
basic rational review, and rational review with bite-that the Court is using in Equal
Protection, Due Process, dormant Commerce Clause, Contract Clause, and Takings
Clause cases. See id. Adoption of such an approach would also forestall concerns,
expressed by three dissenting Justices, that the kind of heightened rational review
scrutiny of the Dolan majority signals a return to the strict scrutiny-like approach of
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2326-29 (Stevens,
Blackmun, & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting) see also Kelso, supra note 2, at 502 n.38
(discussing similar confusion with regard to heightened rational review scrutiny under
the Contract Clause).
87. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) ("[lt is for
the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the
[statute].... It is enough that ... the particular legislative measure was a rational
way to correct it."). For a discussion of the basic elements of minimum rationality
review see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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cious," or "not wholly irrelevant," with no less restrictive alter-
native test being applied.'
In some cases the Court has used phrases like "narrowly
tailored" or "narrowly achieved" to refer to aspects of strict
scrutiny.s However, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, "narrow-
ly drawn" was used to refer to intermediate scrutiny." Thus,
it would be less confusing if the Court would restrict the term
"narrowly drawn" to intermediate scrutiny and use the terms
"precise tailoring," "least restrictive alternative," or "necessary"
for strict scrutiny.9
A similar example of confusing terminology exists when the
Court uses the phrase "reasonable fit" in commercial speech
cases to define the "fit" required at intermediate scrutiny.'
This is not helpful in terms of clarity of expression. The "nar-
rowly drawn" analysis at intermediate scrutiny is more strin-
gent than the heightened rational review analysis suggested by
the phrase "reasonable fit."9' Thus, in the future it would be
88. The strict scrutiny phrases are discussed supra notes 71-73 and accompanying
text. The intermediate scrutiny phrases are discussed supra notes 74-77 and accompa-
nying text. The heightened rational review phrases are discussed supra notes 78-84
and accompanying text. The minimum rationality phrases are discussed supra note 87
and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 169 (1987) (using narrowly
tailored); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (using narrowly achieved); see
generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 575, 579.
90. 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
91. See supra notes 71-73. Such an approach would clarify the confusion that has
occasionally arisen concerning whether at strict scrutiny the "least restrictive alterna-
tive" that will advance the compelling governmental interest "about as wellr is always
required. See, e.g., Paradise, 480 U.S. at 184 (plurality stating that despite a strict
scrutiny approach, the affirmative action remedial plan was not required "to be limit-
ed to the least restrictive means"); id. at 199 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating the
general rule that "to survive strict scrutiny, the District Court order must fit with
greater precision than any alternative remedy." This is a least restrictive alternative
approach.).
92. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2705 (1993) (citing
Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)) ("We made
clear in Fox that our commercial speech cases require a fit between the restriction
and the government interest that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable.").
93. As indicated at supra note 79 and accompanying text, the "weak" less re-
strictive alternative test of heightened rational review, which is phrased in some
cases as a requirement that the statute be "reasonable", see supra note 83 and ac-
companying text, is not as stringent as the independent requirement that the stat-
ute be "narrowly drawn" at intermediate scrutiny. See generally Kelso, supra note 2,
at 499-500, 508 n.70.
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preferable if the phrase "reasonable fit" were dropped in all
cases of intermediate scrutiny in favor of using the phrases
"narrowly drawn," "narrowly tailored," or "close fit."
A third example of confusing terminology results from the
Court's use of the phrase "necessary" in two different ways. At
strict scrutiny, "necessary" has been used as the equivalent of
the "least restrictive alternative" test, or "absolute necessity.' 4
At heightened rational review, the phrase "reasonable and nec-
essary" has been used to refer to the "weak" less restrictive
alternative test, which as part of the overall "reasonableness"
balance, merely requires a "proper" balance between benefits
and burdens, not "absolute necessity."" To avoid confusion,
perhaps "proper" would be a better word choice at heightened
rational review, and reserve "necessary" for the more absolute
necessity of strict scrutiny."
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are two final points regarding the development of a
principled approach to the advancement, relationship, and bur-
den inquiries under legislative "fit" analysis. In a number of
recent cases, the Court has compared the standard of review in
commercial speech cases with the standard of review applied to
time, place, or manner regulations of speech.' If handled care-
94. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
95. See generally supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
96. This alternative use of the phrase "necessary" and the recommendation that
the term "proper" be substituted for "necessary" at heightened rational review is rem-
iniscent of the discussion of the term "necessary" in the landmark case of McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 412-22 (1819) (discussing whether "necessary"
meant "absolute necessity" or merely "convenient," "usefil" or "proper" for purposes of
interpreting the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution).
A similar possible confusion may result from the Courtes recent use of the
phrase "essential nexus" as part of the Takings Clause analysis in Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994). Though the term "essential" may seem a strong
term to use, the "essential nexus" test as applied by the Court in Dolan merely in-
quires whether the government is engaged in legitimate regulatory action unrelated to
"obtaining [property rights] through gimmickry." Id. Thus, in this context, "essential"
seems to mean no more than a "proper" or "useful" regulation advancing "legitimate"
or "permissible" governmental ends.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2705 (1993)
(referring to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)) ("iTihe validity of
time, place, or manner restrictions is determined under standards very similar to
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fully, such an analogy to other free speech cases can be most
appropriate.98 However, the Court's discussion of this analogy
has often been unfocused or just plain confused.
The confusion results from the fact that in three recent cases,
Edenfield v. Fane," United States v. Edge Broadcasting'"
and Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC,"0 ' the Court
has suggested that there is no difference between the basic
mid-level review standard applied to content-neutral time,
place, or manner regulations of speech in cases like Ward v.
Rock Against Racism,"°2 which traditionally has required only
a substantial relationship between means and ends,"3 and the
mid-level review with bite standard applicable to commercial
speech, which normally requires a direct relationship between
means and ends.' As an example of the Court's confusion,
the majority opinion in Edenfield cited Ward for the proposition
those applicable in the commercial speech context"); San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987) (citing United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)) (comparing the standard of review in
commercial speech cases to that in O'Brien, the Court noted that "both ... require a
balance between the governmental interest and the magnitude of the speech restric-
tion.").
98. For example, the Court has explicitly acknowledged that content-neutral time,
place, or manner regulations as seen in Ward, and content-neutral complete bans on
some activity as seen in O'Brien, are actually the same test. See Turner Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994) (using the Ward test and the O'Brien
test simultaneously); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
298 (1984) (noting that the two tests are "little, if any, different").
Such acknowledgement indicates the Court can dispense with the malleable and
often confusing test of whether a regulation should be classified as a reasonable time,
place, or manner regulation versus a complete prohibition on some activity. See Kelso,
supra note 2, at 563-64, 567-68. Instead, the Court can focus on the real questions
involved in the regulation of speech-how much speech is being regulated and in
what way-and analyze those questions under both the "content-based" versus "con-
tent-neutral" doctrine and the legislative fit inquiry into advancement, relationship,
and burden. This approach towards time, place, or manner regulations seems to be
implicit in the Court's statement in Edenfield v. Fane that whether a regulation is a
content-neutral "reasonable time, place, or manner restriction" depends not on any
independent inquiry into the extent of the time, place, or manner regulation, but
instead upon a determination that the regulation has a "close and substantial relation
to the governmental interests asserted." 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1801-02 (1993).
99. 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1801 (1993).
100. 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2705-06 (1993).
101. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
102. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
103. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
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that Ward, like Central Hudson, involved a requirement that
the regulation advance the governmental interest in "a direct
and effective way.""5 This is untrue. The Court did note in
Ward that in fact the statute at issue in Ward did advance the
government's interests in "a direct and effective way."1"s How-
ever, that statement is different than saying the regulation had
to satisfy a "direct relationship" test. Indeed, the Court in Ward
phrased the test by stating that the government could not regu-
late "in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden
does not serve to advance its goals."0 7 This indicates a "sub-
stantial relationship" test.
Of course, the Court has the power to increase the level of
scrutiny in content-neutral time, place, or manner cases like
Ward to mid-level review with bite by requiring a "direct rela-
tionship" test to be satisfied. Indeed, if the Court wants to
increase the level of scrutiny from a "substantial relationship"
test to a "direct relationship" test in any of the other areas
where currently basic mid-level review is applied, such as gen-
der discrimination cases, or cases involving illegitimacy, or
Article IV, Section 2 Privileges and Immunities Clause cases,
the Court has that power as well.' 8 However, the Court
should not pretend that there is only one kind of intermediate
review by implying that "substantial relationship" and "direct
relationship" mean the same thing. As indicated above, there is
a clear, analytically definable difference between a "substantial
relationship" and a "direct relationship" test.'09
105. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1801.
106. Ward, 491 U.S. at 800.
107. Id. at 799.
108. For a discussion of these and other examples in which the Court has applied
basic mid-level review, including discussion of content-neutral regulations of speech
typically involving basic mid-level review, see Kelso, supra note 2, at 504-06, 528-29,
566-69.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 50-67. In any individual case, once the
decision is reached to apply some version of intermediate review, the Court must
decide whether to apply a "substantial relationship" test or the "direct relationship"
test. Once that decision is made, the Court should be intellectually honest about that
choice. For example, in Turner Broadcasting, the Court chose to apply the "direct
relationship" test, citing Edenfield. Turner Broadcasting, 119 S. Ct. at 2470. Given
this decision, the Court should acknowledge that Turner represents the mid-level
review with bite standard of commercial speech, which differs from the traditional
"substantial relationship" test of Ward involving basic mid-level review. For further
discussion of Turner in this light, see Kelso, supra note 37, at nn.134-53 and accom-
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A desire for fewer standards of review is understandable.
Perhaps that explains an attempt to merge basic mid-level
review and mid-level review with bite into one intermediate
standard of review. However, it does not advance a reasoned
understanding of the law to combine the substantial relation-
ship and direct relationship tests, as the Court has recently
done in Fane, Edge, and Turner. From the perspective of rea-
soned elaboration of the law, the difference between a "substan-
tial relationship" and a "direct relationship" should be main-
tained, no matter what level of review is applied to any partic-
ular doctrine."'
The Court also lacks focus in its development of the analogy
between commercial speech and time, place, or manner regula-
tions because the Court does not always distinguish between
time, place, or manner regulations which are content-neutral, to
which the basic mid-level standard of Ward applies,"' and
content-based regulations concerning time, place, or manner
that trigger the strict scrutiny standard of review." The
Court has noted that regulation of commercial speech should be
no greater than non-commercial speech."' Although never offi-
cially stated by the Court, a corollary should be that a content-
panying text.
Similarly, it would be useful if the Court were to acknowledge explicitly that
the standard of review applied in the recent case of Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.,
114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524-26 (1994) (acknowledged by the Court as more vigorous than
basic mid-level review, but not as rigorous as strict scrutiny) is really mid-level re-
view with bite, since the Court imposed a "direct relationship" requirement in con-
junction with an intermediate review advancement and narrowly drawn inquiry. Id.;
see also Kelso, supra note 37, at nn.154-63 and accompanying text.
110. Once a choice is made on the level of scrutiny, it would be best for the Court
to be clear about that choice, and not to use terminology haphazardly. For example,
the Court in gender discrimination cases seems clearly to adopt the "substantial rela-
tionship" test of basic mid-level review. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
However, the Court in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, stated that the test
was "whether the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective and
means is present." 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1981). This might be read to suggest that
gender discrimination cases now involve mid-level review with bite, or it might be
read to suggest that the reference to a "direct" relationship in Hogan was just "loose"
language. After Fane, Edge, and Turner, it is not so clear.
111. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
112. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); see generally Kelso, supra note
2, at 569-73, 590.
113. See Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2705 ("[lIt would be incompatible with the subordi-
nate position of commercial speech . . . to apply a more rigid standard to commercial
speech than is applied to fully protected speech.").
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neutral commercial speech regulation receives only the basic
mid-level review standard"4 applicable to content-neutral reg-
ulations of non-commercial speech, rather than the higher mid-
level with bite standard of Central Hudson."5 This corollary
has not been important in practice. Virtually all commercial
speech cases concern content-based regulations of speech since
commercial speech, rather than political, artistic, or other kinds
of speech, is being regulated."6
A second corollary to the proposition that commercial speech
should receive no higher standard of review than non-commer-
cial speech concerns content-based regulations. Content-based
regulations of non-commercial speech trigger strict scrutiny."7
Thus, as long as content-based commercial speech regulations
trigger no standard of review higher than strict scrutiny, com-
mercial speech will not be preferred over non-commercial
speech. Content-based regulation of commercial speech will thus
be consistent with the Court's basic proposition whether such
regulation triggers strict scrutiny, mid-level review with bite,
basic mid-level review, or rational review."' The Supreme
Court proposition concerning the "subordinate position of com-
mercial speech" therefore leads to no fixed conclusion regarding
the regulation of content-based restrictions on commercial
114. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
115. On Central Hudson being a higher level of intermediate scrutiny than Ward,
see generally supra text accompanying notes 58, 99-109.
116. See, e.g., Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1801 (questioning whether "a flat ban on com-
mercial solicitation could be regarded as a content-neutral time, place, or manner
restriction on speech, a proposition that is open to serious doubt . . . "). The Court
dodged this issue in Fane by improperly recasting the standard in Ward as mid-level
review with bite. This not only heightened the standard of review in Ward, see supra
text accompanying notes 102-107, but also implied, strangely, that for commercial
speech there is no difference between a content-neutral and content-based regulation
of speech: they are both entitled to exactly the same Central Hudson standard of
review.
117. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
118. See Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1804 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (suggesting strict
scrutiny for content-based regulation of commercial speech); Lively, supra note 66, at
299-304 (implying that some commercial speech cases, particularly those authored by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, suggest aspects of rational review); supra text accompanying
notes 56-66 (mid-level review with bite currently the majority approach under the
Central Hudson test); supra text accompanying notes 99-109 (perhaps basic mid-level
review suggested by comparing commercial speech cases to the level of review in
content-neutral time, place, or manner regulations of speech).
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speech. Thus it is irrelevant to an informed analysis of this
issue.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has explored the relationship between statutory
means and ends under equal protection, substantive due pro-
cess, and free speech analysis. Three different inquiries are part
of this legislative "fit" analysis. First, consider what governmen-
tal ends the statute advances: compelling governmental inter-
ests; important, substantial, or significant governmental inter-
ests; legitimate or permissible governmental interests; or imper-
missible governmental interests. Second, apply the relationship
inquiry between the statutory means and the benefits achieved
by the statute. This inquiry has two parts: (1) the extent to
which the statute does not regulate all individuals who are part
of some problem (the underinclusiveness inquiry); and (2) the
manner in which the statute benefits those whom it regulates
(the service inquiry). The third question involves the nature of
the statute's burdens. This burden inquiry also has two parts:
(1) the extent to which the statute imposes burdens on individ-
uals who are not part of the problem (the overinclusiveness
inquiry); and (2) the degree of burden placed on individuals
properly regulated by the statute (the oppressiveness or restric-
tiveness inquiry).
Of course, these "fit" questions differ depending upon whether
minimum rationality review, heightened rational review, inter-
mediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny is involved in the case.
These different aspects of legislative "fit" analysis provide a
more structured approach to questions concerning equal protec-
tion, due process, and free speech doctrine.
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